to the EU's sanction policies. These features confirm a hybridity in which legal sources are interacting within the AFSJ field. We aim to critically assess the current state of play of the regulation of financial crimes in the contemporary EU. Furthermore, the paper focuses on recent developments in the area of financial crimes by looking at the framework for EU anti-fraud legislation: OLAF, the proposed EU Public prosecutor, the function of Eurojust and the proposed Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law. Specifically, we discuss the way the Fourth AntiMoney Laundering Directive came about and if, as claimed by the EU itself, it equips the EU with the right legal toolkit for fighting money laundering and terror financing. We also set out to scrutinize the constitutional implications of an increased powers vested in the EU Agencies in this area as powerful players for EU enforcement and we discuss the question of accountability as well as the problem of a human rights deficit in this area.
We end however on a happier note by looking at the judiciaries concern to maintain individual data protection and the EU Court of Justice as a guarantee of proportionality and reasonableness in European legislative action.
irregularities in the internal market. After all, the AFSJ embodies a complicated hybrid system of interacting norms (global, EU and national) and should therefore be understood in the light of the classic EU law policy of the internal market. In short, the AFSJ deals with, inter alia, security issues, border control, anti-terrorism law and crime. While market creation has always been focused on principally justifying aims of the Union's increased powers and curtailment of Member State competences, 3 the EU's rulemaking powers-when applied outside the traditional context of the internal market-ask pressing questions. They ask not just how far national sovereignty can be overturned by other concerns, such as the need for the construction of the EU market, but also its interaction with the EU's expanding security agenda and the role of fundamental rights protection. efforts have been hampered because they are not entitled or allowed to undertake any anti-fraud investigations.
Committee of Budgetary Control who recommended that a 'flying squad' should be created to investigate allegations of fraud raised this problem.
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As a result, 'Unite Co-ordination de la lute anti-fraude', (UCLAF) was established in 1987 and became operational in 1988, with the objective of dealing with fraud against the EU.
14 UCLAF was created as a result of an increase in financial irregularities within the EU and the resulting criticism.
15
Its effectiveness was limited due to its small number of "desk bound" staff 16 and its disorganised structure. will be shown below though with regard to the broader picture of market regulation and the construction of an AFSJ, the EU has largely transgressed the division of competence with regard to EU and Member States finances and fiscal powers. Therefore, it is suggested that the limitation set in Article 325 TFEU entails a rather cosmetic rule since the overall approach adopted by the EU seems not to be limited to fight fraud against the EU but also sets out to regulate the Member States as a result of the financial crisis. 
The proposed establishment of a European Public Prosecutor

EU Anti-Money Laundering Action: The Fourth Directive
The fight against dirty money has always been a high priority in the EU.
Money laundering is by definition based on another crime termed a predicate offence, which gives rise to the laundering in question. In this respect, it should, however, be observed that there is an on-going debate The Fourth Money Laundering Directive addresses a number of important issues that include the variation of the risk-based approach, the development of new rules that apply to electronic money, registers for ultimate beneficial ownership, no distinction between internal and external politically exposed persons, improved levels of cooperation between financial intelligence units and an improved sanctions regime. 50 Additionally, Cogman noted that "key changes relate to firms' compliance obligations rather than to the substantive money laundering offences … proposed amendments to know your client … Controversial proposals for a public register of the beneficial owners of companies".
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Within such a risk-based approach to money laundering, private actors, such as lawyers and banks, are expected to make risk assessments of their customers and divide them into low and high-risk. 31 The rationale for actively engaging the private sector in the AML process is to make them collect the appropriate information. "By adopting a risk-based approach, competent authorities and financial institutions are able to ensure that measures to prevent or mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing are commensurate to the risks identified.
This will allow resources to be allocated in the most efficient ways. The principle is that resources should be directed in accordance with priorities so that the greatest risks receive the highest attention". 54 Furthermore, the FATF has issues several guidance notes for the private sector that seeks to incorporate the risk-based approach. 55 The use of a risk-based approach of the FATF is now contained in Recommendation 10 (formerly Recommendation 5).
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In addition to the adoption of the risk-based approach by the FATF, the EU has also embraced this "key concept". 57 However, it is important to note that the EU was initially skeptical of adopting such an approach. 58 The Third
Money Laundering Directive follows a very similar stance to that contained in Recommendation.
taking risk-based and adequate measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer". Therefore, the risk-based approach is "entrenched into EU law". 59 The risk-based approach has also been adopted system. As noted, according to Article 88 TFEU, "Europol's mission shall be to support and strengthen action by the Member States' police authorities." It is then meant to act as a complementing authority, but it is becoming a primary actor. The present paper can do no more than point out the complex interrelationship between the need to decentralize and make the Commission more effective, and basic concerns about the rule of law and legitimacy as well as accountability in criminal law.
EU Financial Regulation and white collar crime: the UK experience
As noted above, market regulation in the area of financial crimes and consumer confidence were not a focus of the EU's initial responses to the financial crisis nor were they reflected on the international agenda. requirement to carry out regular assessments of the adequacy of AML systems so as to protect themselves from being used to further financial crime; 87 the allocation of a director or senior manager with overall responsibility for establishing and maintaining an AML system; and, the appointment of a cer (MLRO). 88 The SYSC regime seeks to provide the regulated sector Money Laundering Reporting Offiith an even higher degree of flexibility, which allows them to identify the risks and determine how they can best allocate their resources in areas which are most vulnerable.
This approach seeks to encourage and enable the regulated sector to target their resources most appropriately on activities at risk from money laundering, thus reducing AML compliance costs
The most important tools that the FSA has in the fight against money laundering are its extensive investigative and enforcement powers. 89 The FSA has the ability to require information from firms, 90 to appoint investigators, 91 to obtain the assistance of overseas financial regulators 92 and provide appointed investigators with additional powers. 93 Furthermore, the FSA has become a prosecuting authority in respect of certain money laundering offences. 94 These powers apply whether or not the entity to be prosecuted is actually regulated by the FSA. 95 The FSA also has the power to impose a financial penalty where it establishes that there has been a contravention by an authorized person of any requirement imposed under FSMA 2000. 96 For example, the FSA has fined firms and MLROs who have breached its AML rules even where there was no evidence of money being laundered. 97 This seems highly problematic from the perspective of fair trial and the presumption of innocence.
However, it is important to note that by virtue of the Financial Services Act 2012, the FSA was replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority and the financial crime statutory objective was removed and it is now associated with the FCAs consumer protection and market integrity objectives. 98 The FCA stated that "one of our objectives is to ensure the integrity of the markets … a key part of that is ensuring that our markets operate honestly and that the firms we regulate understand, and manage, the financial crime risks that they face". 99 Hill stated that "the FCA must also have regard to taking action in relation to financial crime. This will be a freestanding duty to take action in relation to any fraud, dishonesty, misconduct and handling the proceeds of crime". 100 The regulator will continue to concentrate its resources towards maintaining "standards of conduct in the financial services industry". 101 This means that the FCA will adopt a very similar approach towards the reduction of financial crime as that adopted by the FSA, namely that regulated firms must have appropriate systems and controls. Another legacy left by the FSA are the "the tools … impose penalties for … money laundering". 102 Furthermore, the FCA will be expected to follow and further develop the FSA's credible deterrence strategy. 103 This would involve the FCA continuing to "taking tough, targeted, effective and public action against misconduct perpetrated by firms and individuals". 104 The influence of the EU is clearly illustrated by the UK's continued adoption of the EU's money laundering and Directives.
However, it is interesting to note that the limited influence of the EU on the enforcement strategy of the city regulator and it therefore appears that the UK is becoming the 'yard stick' on the enforcement of its financial crime objectives that the EU and other Member States could consider adopting.
Fundamental rights? Challenges ahead beyond Europe
While the discussion on the increased involvement of Agencies as monitors crime is still at the heart of the EU's "getting tough on crime" approach, the old internal market endeavors in this area are now much more complex than they used to be. 108 In particular the extended powers granted to EU Agencies asks difficult question about democratic oversight in the AFSJ. 
